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AMENDMENTS-PENAL LAWS RELATIVE TO DELINQUENT CHILDREN-TREATMENT OF FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD CHILD CHARGED WITH
CAPITAL CRImE.-"The time is well overdue to state in the law in no
uncertain terms that a child under the age of fifteen has no criminal
responsibility irrespective of the act involved." 1 This statement made
by Governor Dewey at the time he approved these bills effectively
sums up the changes made by the Laws of New York 1948, cc.
553-557, effective March 29, 1948.
Chapter 554 rewords Section 486(3) of the Penal Law,2 which
defines delinquent children, and as revised includes all children under
fifteen years of age and fifteen-year-olds who commit any crimes except those which are punishable by death or life imprisonment. Even
in the latter case, however, such fifteen-year-olds may be treated as
delinquent children if an order has been made removing the action
to the Children's Court. Chapter 553 adds seven new subdivisions
to Section 312 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denoting therein
the process to be used for such removal. The Children's Court Act,
the Domestic Relations Court Act and the Social Welfare Law have
also been amended to the same effect.3
Before proceeding to discuss these changes, let us first examine
the prior law in order that the true significance of these changes
may be more clearly understood. Contrary to the general presumption of criminal responsibility 4 a child under the age of seven years
was conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing any crime.
A child of seven years or more, but less than twelve years was presumed incapable of committing a crime, but this presumption was
rebuttable upon sufficient proof of a capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.6 A child over twelve years fell under
the general presumption of criminal responsibility. 7 These presumptions remain unchanged today. Of equal importance was the distinction made between crimes and juvenile delinquency. A child under

I2 Governor's memorandum on approving these amendments.

N. Y. PENAL LAW § 486(3). "The word 'delinquent' shall include any
child over seven and under sixteen years of age (a) who violates any law of
the state or of the United States or any municipal ordinance or who commits
any act which if committed by an adult would be a crime, except any child
fifteen years of age who commits an act which if committed by an adult would
be punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless an order removing the action to the children's court has been made and filed pursuant to section 312(c)
subdivision (c) and section 312F subdivisions (a) and (b) of the code of criminal procedure..
" [Part in italics added by new amendment.]
3 N. Y. CHILDREN'S COURT AcT § 2(2) amended by chapter 555; N. Y.
DoM. REL. CT. AcT §2(15) amended by chapter 556; N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE

LAW § 371(3) (b) amended by chapter 557.
4N. Y. PENAL LAW § 815.
5

Laws of N. Y. 1948.

N. Y. PENAL LAW § 816; People v. Davis, 1 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 230
(N. 6Y. 1823).
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 817; People v. Domenico, 45 Misc. 309, 92 N. Y.
Supp. 390 (Co. Ct. 1904).
7 See Murphy v Perlstein, 73 App. Div. 256, 76 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dep't
1902).
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sixteen who committed an act which would be a crime if committed
by an adult, was not guilty of any crime, but of juvenile delinquency
only.8 The exceptions to this rule were those crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment which were four in number: treason, kidnapping, murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.
It would seem, however, that in the case of a child between seven and
twelve years who had committed one of the aforementioned acts, it
was necessary before treating such a child as a criminal that the presumption of incapacity be first successfully rebutted.
The changes as now made redefine a juvenile delinquent as any
child over seven years and under sixteen years who commits any act
in violation of the law, but if the child be fifteen years of age and the
act be punishable by death or life imprisonment, the act may be considered juvenile delinquency if, but only if, an order removing the
child to the Children's Court has been filed pursuant to Section 312
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, a child today under fifteen years of age who commits treason, kidnapping or murder in the
first or second degree will escape the penalty of death or life imprisonment by virtue of this amendment. However, a child between fifteen
and sixteen, although still a juvenile delinquent where other crimes
are concerned, can yet be convicted of a crime that is punishable by
death or life imprisonment. Whether such child shall be punished
as a criminal or as a juvenile delinquent is now left to the discretion
of certain defined authorities. The determination to treat as a criminal, rather than a delinquent, may take place in two ways: (1) the
grand jury, the district attorney, or the court itself may feel that it
should not recommend that the defendant be examined as provided
by Section 312 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or (2) the court,
after the examination of the defendant, may feel that the ends of
justice and the best interests of the state would not be served if the
defendant were removed to Children's Court. In either case, the
defendant would then be prosecuted as an adult criminal.
The procedure to be followed in removing a child charged with
a capital crime to the Children's Court is as follows: (1) Upon
presentation of the indictment, the district attorney may recommend
that the defendant be examined in order that the court may determine
whether the action should be removed to Children's Court and if such
recommendation is approved, the indictment shall be filed as a sealed
indictment, but only as to the public. 9 (2) The recommendation for
examination of the defendant may be made by the grand jury, the
district attorney or the court itself.10 (3) If the defendant consents
to the examinations, physical and mental, the indictment shall be held
in abeyance. 1 (4) Should the court determine upon the conclusion
8

N. Y.
N. Y.
ION. Y.
9

PENAL LAW § 2186.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 312-b.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 312-c(a).

11 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §312-c(b).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 23

of the examination that the action shall be removed to Children's
12
Court, the indictment shall be dismissed and the action removed.
(5) Should the court determine that the action should not be removed, the indictment shall be unsealed and the defendant prosecuted
as though the proceeding thereunder had not been had. 13 (6) No
statements made by the defendant during the examination may be
used against him, but they may, however, be taken into consideration
at the time of judgment.:4 (7) All proceedings held under this article shall be private and held in a part of the court separate from those
parts used for proceedings pertaining to adults. 15 (8) The proceedings under this section shall be applicable even before an indictment
has been returned by the grand jury, if the district attorney so
recommends.' 6
In a recent case the court interpreted these new amendments.
Emile Scott, a boy of fifteen, was forcibly ejected from a dance hall
by a police officer because of his conduct. Scott together with the
defendant Irving Farrell took a rifle to the roof of a nearby building.
Farrell returned to the street and when the officer emerged from the
dance hall, he signaled to Scott who proceeded to fire upon and seriously wound the police officer. The court held that a child defendant under fifteen, regardless of the crime charged, is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Children's Court, and a child between
fifteen and sixteen is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Children's Court
until an indictment has been sworn out against such
17
defendant.
The statutes under discussi6n and those preceding them in the
gradual process of evolution in dealing with child criminals have their
basis in sociological and psychological research. It has been found
to be harmful to throw such children into association with hardened
criminals. Furthermore, the results of various studies indicate that
it is often possible to educate youthful offenders to become upstanding
citizens who respect the law. In the treatment of delinquents, punishment is not the aim, but rather each case is studied, family background and individual traits and interests are analyzed, all with a
view to correction rather than punishment. It can be seen, therefore,
that these new amendments are but another step forward in the
attempt to accomplish this aim.
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Matter of Farrell, 191 Misc. 582, Rel. Ct. 1948).
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